FTW OFFICES
BURGLARIZED

All Computers Destroyed
FTW Crippled But Not Dead

by
Michael C. Ruppert

July 5th, 2006 4:09pm [PST], ASHLAND – Sometime after 7:30 PM on the evening of Sunday June 25, 2006, an unknown number of suspects entered the FTW offices by means of two passkeys. Once inside, a sledgehammer was used to smash through four solid-core doors secured with deadbolt locks to gain entry to our webmaster’s office, my office, the administrative office and a storage area. All seven FTW computers were ripped or disconnected from peripherals and transported to a central unoccupied area of the building where their covers were unscrewed and removed. After the covers had been removed, all seven computers were smashed with sledgehammers. My monitor was also smashed at my desk. The computers were totally destroyed.

(continued on page 3)
There are strong similarities between French arrogance at Dienbienphu and US attitudes in Iraq. The immediate victims of a US loss would be the Neocons. Great, but would that change anything?

It certainly wouldn’t in terms of the American corporate operating system. But there are other operating systems out there. All are in one way or another dominated or mightily influenced by the way money works. In this new, exclusive FTW four-part series, Stan Goff provides one of the most cogent analyses of modern history over the past three years I could imagine.

As Stan Goff writes here: “The Bush administration demonstrated its resolve to pursue a new doctrine – preemptive war. There was no longer a question of if Russian and China would bloc against the US. The only questions were when and how.” – MCR

ENCROACHMENT

by

Stan Goff

Military/Veterans Affairs Editor

PART I

“A year ago none of us could see victory. Now we can see it clearly, like light at the end of the tunnel.”

- General Henri Navarre, 1953

Introduction

June 19th 2006, 3:13pm [PST] - Referring to Dien Bien Phu, the decisive battle in which General Vo Nguyen Giap commanded the defeat of the French colonial armed forces in Vietnam, Giap would later write:

Navarre [the French commander at Dien Bien Phu] asserted that with such powerful forces and strong defense systems, Dien Bien Phu was the strongest fortified entrenched camp ever seen in Indochina. It was “an impregnable fortress.” From this subjective viewpoint he considered that an attack by us would be very improbable, that if our troops ventured to launch an offensive he would have the opportunity to inflict an inevitable defeat on us. He went so far as to arrogantly challenge us to an attack!

Navarre’s challenge was the 1953 French equivalent of “Bring ‘em on!”

(continued on page 9)
There are suspects and the Ashland, Oregon police department (APD) is conducting an active criminal investigation. For that reason I am not at liberty to either discuss or disclose certain details, especially the extent of damage to hard drives, back up status before the burglary, or whether data from damaged hard drives is, or will ever be, recoverable.

To date I have been impressed by the cooperation and thoroughness shown by APD and I intend to cooperate with them fully and provide whatever assistance I can as their investigation continues. In previous statements I have mentioned a meth ring operating locally and have also stated that I had seen no direct evidence of US government involvement. Those statements are still correct, although I will add that I also have not ruled out US government involvement.

The only way to describe the damage is that it has been utterly devastating from business, emotional and professional perspectives. My residence was vandalized a week before the burglary. As I write this report, a full ten days after the burglary, we are still unable to download orders from the internet, and we are also unable to ship any products. We have a large number of orders out there but unfortunately we cannot get any of that money into our checking account at present.

We are insured and it appears as though most of the losses will be covered. However, there are going to be significant cash outlays required to resume even a semblance of normal operations before insurance reimbursement takes place. This includes expensive data recovery from certain damaged hard drives. For the time being, please send any donations to our mailing address, 655 Washington St., Ashland, OR 97520, Please indicate if you would like your donation returned once we have received reimbursement from our insurance carrier. We do need all the help we can get.
For new subscribers and those concerned about interruption of our services please be advised that, as time permits, we will make arrangements to extend subscriptions to make up for any lost time.

I have no words to describe the viciousness of this attack. No other valuables were taken and none of our other furnishings or equipment was destroyed. It is apparent that destroying data stored in our computers was the primary objective in this crime. Current estimated damages are in excess of $20,000. Please do not expect us to be able to immediately respond to emails. We are short-staffed and everyone here is doing a great job under the obvious and very unpleasant stress. We have desperate need for a bookkeeper in house to help reconstruct financial records and restore normal cash flow operations. Our problem is finding one willing to work in our environment. Those of you who have been loyal FTW fans and subscribers know of the many, many challenges we have had to face over the years. I am now 55 years old and have been fighting this fight for a long time. This is a time for a rethinking of all of our priorities. The one question I and the rest of FTW is trying to answer is how can we best serve you without experiencing the same battles again.

My computer smashed at my desk.

Vandalism to the Ruppert home.

All the Dead Computers.

As the world around us and within the United States grows darker, I intend to use this time to evaluate where we go from here. The first thing I need to do is to consult closely with our writers and several key advisors and friends. FTW is not dead but I must honestly tell you that we are on life support at the moment.

As we restore our operations, piece by piece, we will resume the publication of new stories. We promise to finish the Pat Tillman series. Other than that, as those of us who have made FTW work arrive at a plan, we will keep you advised.

In the meantime, please let these photographs speak for themselves. Send us whatever help you can, and continue to give us the same loving patience you have always given us as these brutal and difficult challenges have arisen.

These are tough times for everyone.

Michael C. Ruppert

MULTI-POLAR DISORDER
Hunkering Down For Asymmetric War

by Carolyn Baker, Ph.D.

Holy cow! We’re alone!
Glen Beck in Interview with Robert Baer, former CIA agent and Middle East Specialist, CNN Headline News, July 21, 2006

July 24th 2006, 11:50 [PST] - On July 12 two Israeli soldiers were kidnapped by the Lebanese Hezbollah organization, resulting in swift, armed retaliation by Israel.
At the outset of the conflict, Israel was attempting to back Hezbollah in Lebanon away from the southern border in order to create a buffer zone to shield Israel from Hezbollah rockets. Over
the course of the past two weeks, however, we have seen not an Israel “defending itself” as it vociferously maintains, but an Israel on the offensive. Whereas Hezbollah’s attacks on Israel were highly strategic, inflicting very few casualties, Israel has reacted much less strategically inflicting a much higher number of casualties.

Syrian political analyst, Sami Moubayed, writes that Israel may be attempting to repeat its 1982 triumph of driving Yasser Arafat out of Lebanon with its military might, but it may not be able to accomplish this feat with Hezbollah. Essentially, Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, may have cornered themselves into positions which would make an exit extremely problematic. Were either to surrender now without having made significant gains for Lebanese and Israeli public opinion, both could be committing political suicide. Olmert entered the war promising his country that he would liberate the kidnapped soldiers and destroy Hezbollah, but instead, he has failed to accomplish either objective even as Hezbollah’s attacks have embarrassed the Israeli government. As for Nasrallah who entered the conflict promising the release of Lebanese prisoners from Israeli jails and the liberation of the Israeli-occupied Sheba Farms, neither objective has been accomplished.

What has been achieved is the destruction of Lebanon. British Guardian reporter, Timothy Garton Ash, refers to the emerging geopolitical scenario as “multi-polar disorder” as opposed to the uni-polar condition of American supremacy. The development of technologies with potentially violent methods of delivery mean that small states or organizations can challenge political giants and seduce them into asymmetric warfare which FTW military affairs editor, Stan Goff, defines as, “the use of unconventional tactics to counter the overwhelming conventional military superiority of an adversary.”

Michael Clarke of the Times Online, asks why Israel has been sucked into this asymmetric war. “One reason” says Clarke, “is that Israeli military and intelligence services have been achieving real successes targeting Hamas terrorist leaders in Gaza and the West Bank. Dramatic increases in Israeli intelligence have allowed their security forces to target individuals much more precisely, to penetrate terror networks and intercept a number of plots.” Feeling confident that they were succeeding against Hamas, Israel has taken the fight directly to them. However, since not much has been achieved in almost two weeks of fighting, the Israeli government is left reaching for higher political ground in the court of world opinion. According to Ash, this is exactly what asymmetric warfare ultimately means—that the most powerful military in the history of the world can lose a war, not on the battlefield of bombs and bullets, but on the battlefield of world opinion. Clearly, this is the state of affairs in the U.S. occupation of Iraq, and it appears that Israel is going to be as vulnerable to asymmetric warfare as the United States has been.

Another issue virtually unmentioned by mainstream media is the water crisis occurring in the Middle East and affecting all players in the region. Over the past 70 years, the world’s population has tripled while water demand has increased six-fold. On the West Bank, Israel controls the water supply from the Jordan River which has left Palestinians with just enough water for basic survival. Murhaf Jouejati, a scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute in Washington, agrees that the allocation of water in Israel leaves the Palestinians in a very desperate situation. But he says the water issue is a symptom of the region’s broader political problems. All attempts to solve the water crisis in the Middle East look like they would fail in the absence of an agreement on the larger political conflict. So if we are going to solve the water issue between Arabs and Israelis, it is not going to be through low level or low political programs. It is going to be through the resolution of the larger political conflict.

At this point, we do not yet know exactly how the two 800-pound gorillas, oil and the dollar, play into the current scenario. We do know that Syria, accused by the United States as supporting terrorism, plans to end its currency peg to the dollar by December of this year. This in addition to Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Sweden, and Finland who have all indicated their plans to diversify their reserves away from the dollar.

A number of mysterious questions continue to nag: How did the rockets launched against Israel by Hezbollah, allegedly made in China and sent from Iran, arrive in Lebanon when the only way they could logistically be transported would be through Syria or through Turkey where pro-U.S. and anti-Iranian Kurds would be encountered? What is the role of oil in the present equation? What do Condoleezza Rice’s cryptic references to “a new Middle East” mean? To what extent is Iran behind Hezbollah’s assaults and if so, is it raising the stakes by giving the message: Go after Hezbollah, and we’ll shut down the oil?

The head of Iranian armed forces, Maj.-Gen. Hasan Firuzabadi called on Arab states to cut oil supplies to Israel in response to its military offensive against Lebanon according to the Iranian news agency ISNA reports.

According to Michael Clarke, “There is growing evidence that Iran encouraged Hezbollah to attack now so as to widen the diplomatic struggle over its nuclear ambitions. A Shi’ite front against Israel and its western friends would put extra cards into Iran’s diplomatic hand.” Moubayed summarizes that destroying Hezbollah by war is very difficult, yet destroying Israel is impossible for Hezbollah who will get the upper hand only if Iran enters the battle, but Iran has said that it will only be dragged into war if Israel attacks Syria. He anticipates that the United States will continue to support the

Haaretz News reported on Sunday, July 23, that Hamas leadership in Gaza is ready to halt rocket fire as part of a cease-fire deal that could end Israeli action in the Gaza Strip. The plan, initiated by Egypt, would include freeing kidnapped solider Gilad Shalit, a joint cease-fire, and the cessation of Israeli assassinations in the Gaza Strip.

A later release of Palestinian prisoners would also be part of the deal. Hamas political leaders in Syria may or may not agree to such a deal, and although most Palestinian factions have agreed to the Egyptian proposal, they argue that Israel will not be ready for a cease-fire as long as Shalit is held captive.

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war of attrition until casualties and human disaster ruin thousands of lives, morale, and finances. The U.S. will then push Hezbollah back into the Lebanese heartland and lobby for U.N. peacekeeping troops on the Lebanese-Israeli border. Were that to occur, Hezbollah would have no base from which to launch a war on Israel, and it would have no choice but to transform into a 100% political party in the Lebanese system. If Moubayed’s analysis is correct, this could be the last military battle for Hezbollah. However, if events do not unfold as he forecasts, then Israel will be forced to contend with asymmetric warfare, which as the United States has learned since its occupation of Iraq, is profoundly draining of resources and lives.

Regardless of how the situation plays out, all nations understand that Israel is a client state of the United States and that the empire is being backed into a corner. It is likewise understood that Hezbollah is an Iranian client organization and that it has provoked the current situation, but ultimate endgame remains unclear. In the above interview, Glen Beck asked Robert Baer which countries are our allies, which are part of the axis (of evil), and which are “spineless.” While I have many reservations about quoting Baer, the infamous CIA agent on whose novel the disastrous movie, “Syriana” was based, in this case, his assessment is borne out by merely witnessing current world events. The essence of Baer’s appraisal was that geopolitically, the U.S. functions essentially alone—its uni-polar “moment” in history subsiding as wars of attrition devour the beast and its appendages.

1 Bunkered Down For A War Of Attrition (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HG22Ak01.html)
2 Lebanon, North Korea, Russia…Here Is The World’s New Multipolar Disorder (http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1824420,00.html)
3 Continent Of Vulnerability (http://www.sandersresearch.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=803&Itemid=67)
4 Israel Faces The Dangers Of An Asymmetric War (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-22811776,00.html)
5 Nine Qassam Rockets Land In Western Negev; No Injuries (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/741409.html)
7 Iran general staff chief commander: the Arabs must close all oil pipelines to Israel (http://www.isna.ir/Main/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-756990&Lang=E)

[Conspiracy, obstruction of justice, evidence tampering are just three crimes uncovered in this installment as we look at what is probably the most thorough and complete public picture of how Pat Tillman died that will ever be published. It is not for the squeamish.

This is why Stan Goff’s twenty-plus years of experience in Rangers and Special Forces is so valuable. As for the crimes we’ll disclose in the rest of the series; Stan is just getting warmed up. After finishing our investigation and complete review of more than 2,000 pages of records, FTW will now accelerate its publication of the remaining sections to one a week. – MCR]

The Tillman Files - Part 4
Firefight
by Stan Goff
FTW Military/Veterans Affairs Editor

“It’s not known, to the best of my understanding.”


By the first week of May, 2004, there were public calls for the resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld from every cardinal direction, including Congress. The Abu Ghraib scandal was in full flower. April had been a nightmare month in Iraq.

The intrepid Seymour Hersh, having already broken some of the biggest political and military scandals in history, had ignited another crisis with the Abu Ghraib story, and on May 16th, he issued a follow-on story that Rumsfeld had outlined his plan for the torture center with the directive, “Grab whom you must, do what you want.” Had the story been untrue, there is little doubt the administration would have either put Hersh before a judge or rolled him like they did Dan Rather.

Instead, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD-PA) Lawrence DiRita issued an outraged statement: “This is the most hysterical piece of journalist malpractice I have ever observed.”

For those who are familiar with the classic political flick, “All the President’s Men,” about the Watergate scandal, DiRita’s rant qualifies as a “non-denial denial.”

The reason I bring this up in the context of Pat Tillman’s death, just weeks before the Abu Ghraib scandal reached its fever pitch, is that DiRita was near the very top of the bureaucratic obelisk of-obedience in the damage control effort mounted in response to Tillman’s death. There were no little crises those days, only really big ones. The ASD-PA’s office was in a Category 3 storm, and there was no way that office could permit a story of fatal incompetence and ambition that took the life of a famous athlete turned Ranger to happen then.

People have asked me, as I point out how many little loopholes there are in the official accounts of what happened to Pat Tillman, “Didn’t they know? Didn’t they realize that they could not sit on this forever?”

The answer is, they didn’t have the time and space to acknowledge such a thing then. The future emergency could not compete for their attention like the current one, and allowing the true story of Pat Tillman out then would have been the weight that tipped the lifeboat. They really had no choice.

Pat Tillman had been killed at dusk on April 22nd. By April 23rd, the word had been passed all the way to Washington
the UCMJ was shredded (literally or figuratively). That declaration off the fact that a formal investigation conducted under Title 10, Chapter 7, Part 15, paragraph 6 investigation was convened as an Article 15-6 investigation under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Dr. Lawrence DiRita. His job was spin control. And no killing could have happened before that he knew, the other person who was surely “in the loop” was Lawrence DiRita. His job was spin control. And no killing could have happened.

This series will return to all the ways that the spinners did their jobs; but now we want to do the best we can with what we know to explain what actually happened on the afternoon of April 22nd.

There can be no separation of operations and so-called “public affairs” (spin). This is true of the conduct of the war; and it is also true in the death of Pat Tillman. As we begin to reconstruct the events – as closely as we can given the mosaic of statements and the disappearance of Captain Richard Scott’s original Article 15-6 investigation, we have to foreground one fact: There was no urgent tactical reason for 2nd Platoon (“Black Sheep”), Company A, 2nd Ranger Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment to arrive at Manah on April 22nd instead of April 23rd. The pressure to arrive as quickly as possible was based on the general directive – official or intuited by good bureaucrats – to show “progress.”

This kind of pressure snowballs. It gets heavier as it rolls down the hill. The demand to complete a mission checklist at the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) in Khost on April 22, 2004 was driven not by any tactical necessity. In fact, as was true when I participated in the occupation of Haiti in 1994, there was no coherent strategy being pursued at all… except to stay. Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Kauzlarich, the Cross Commander in this heterodox set-up, was radiating that sense of urgency to complete a mission checklist to his subordinates, beginning with his operations officer (S-3), going through Captain Saunders, the A Company Commander, and from him to A Company Executive Officer, Captain Dennis.

Captain Dennis was the principle person in communication with Blacksheep Platoon Leader First Lieutenant David Uthlaut that fateful day.

As we progress through this narrative, it is important to point out in advance that the main points have been corroborated in sworn statements. There are contradictions between key aspects of some of those statements and those made during interviews with the initial investigator, Captain Scott. But the initial investigation was declared “preliminary,” then “absorbed” into the second investigation. This was a clear and criminal violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

The investigation was convened as an Article 15-6 investigation. The declaration that it was preliminary is a feint to throw outsiders off the fact that a formal investigation conducted under the UCMJ was shredded (literally or figuratively). That declaration after the investigation was completed cannot change this. The Pentagon has taken an entire investigation that resulted in recommendations for criminal charges and concealed it. This is obstruction of justice, evidence tampering, and conspiracy. Anyone with half a brain knows, too, that the probability is very high that culpability rises to the top.

An Article 15-6 investigation would not have been ordered at all had there not already been a very high index of suspicion that Pat Tillman’s death was by fratricide.

According to remarks made by Captain Richard Scott, the original Article 15-6 investigating officer, to the third investigating officer, General Gary Jones, there was serious negligence and several violations of the Rules Of Engagement. Witness statements had been changed, said Scott. In discussing these violations Scott specifically referenced the vehicle that fired on Pat Tillman and the other friendlies.

It is reasonable then to assume (after reviewing all available documents) that Scott’s now disappeared investigation would have:

1. threatened to level charges of negligent homicide and Geneva violations at members of Staff Sergeant Greg Baker’s vehicle (the vehicle that killed an allied Afghan militiaman and Specialist Patrick Tillman);
2. concluded that the mission itself was driven by a “false sense of urgency” to arrive in Manah on an arbitrary deadline with no tactical advantage – an urgency that fatally abbreviated the field planning procedures for the platoon (called Troop Leading Procedures, or TLP);
3. flown in the face of the administration’s desperate need to block any more bad news from Central Command reaching the American public;
4. negated the damage control effort taken within all these diverse agendas that resulted in the award of a fraudulently deceptive award of the Silver Star;

The Scott report was doomed.

So FTW’s report has to read between a few lines. We have to infer from a list of evocative statements that escaped the weary redactor’s pen how exactly the changes were made between the investigation conducted by Captain Scott and Lieutenant Colonel Kauzlarich (in which he, by then, was essentially investigating himself).

Key among those contradictions are:
1. the order to split the units in order to get “boots on the ground” in Manah;
2. the character and intensity of the so-called ambush;
3. the light conditions when Tillman and his Afghan colleague (we have been un able to learn his name – another example of how this society regards the lives of non-Americans), and;
4. the distance from SSG Baker’s vehicle and Pat Tillman’s position, when he and his colleague were killed.

SEARCH AND DESTROY
When Vietnam ground down into a directionless “body-count” war, the name of missions where soldiers simply roved from place to place looking for enemies to kill or civilians to detain was “search and destroy.” When this appellation acquired a bad reputation, the term was changed to “reconnaissance in force,” and so the name-changing game goes in the military. In 2004, this mindless mapping exercise was referred to as “Clearance in Zone” (CZ). The tendency to further abstract the names of these operations assists the public in its dissociation of warfare from any form of human pain.

The Black Sheep were conducting CZ ops in Paktia Province, southwest of Khoust and around eight kilometers from the Pakistani border, on April 20, 2004, when the sound and tear of the operational tempo and the brutally rugged terrain deadlined one of their Hummers (the up-armored versions now called M-1114s). This was the beginning of a delay.

At the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) in Khoust, this was part of a moving picture. There were multiple units in the field, and the TOC was both directing and tracking all of them. Any commander who is facing pressure from on high to “show progress,” as LTC Kauzlarich was as Cross Commander, is alerted when the term delay is used. He (combat arms is still an exclusively male domain in the military) begins to focus his attention on it. Everyone all along the chain of command was feeling this pressure.

Conjectural muttering somewhere in Alexandria, VA:

We can’t work with this pressure. I wish I could take those dip shits who took the pictures in that prison and put my thumbs on their throats. Can’t someone get some control over the media on this? Start pushing a victory message. Fallujah and Najaf are decisive battles in the struggle for Iraqi democracy or something like that… What’s going on in Afghanistan? Hit our think tanks up. Tell them to push on the theme that Afghanistan is showing us the way for Iraq… and tell Abazaid to tell those commanders we better see something that looks like progress… I don’t give a fuck what… I want lists of successes… I want something we can check off… I want something we can list out as bullet-points on briefings… and you tell him the bullet points on someone’s evaluation will be on the line…

By April 15th, the leading stories on the GWOT were: “About 880 Iraqis and 87 U.S. soldiers have been killed this month. Among the Iraqi dead are more than 600 people — mostly civilians — in Fallujah, according to the city hospital’s director” (AP), “An Italian hostage has been killed by Iraqi insurgents who are threatening to kill three others, the Italian Government has confirmed” (ITV), “The insurrection in Shia areas of Iraq was not a sudden explosion, nor was it primarily inspired by the events in Falluja. It was, instead, the result of a long series of actions and reactions between the Coalition’s armed forces and increasingly organized and anti-American Shia militias. The most important single event was the immensely important, but barely reported, announcement by Coalition Provisional Authority head L. Paul Bremer, that the United States had ‘found a legal basis for American troops to continue their military control over the security situation in Iraq’ even if the Iraqis ask the U.S. to leave after June 30” (Michael Schwartz), “The United States this year will have to approve a ‘massive’ new spending bill of an estimated $70 billion to meet its obligations in Iraq, a prominent U.S. military analyst said on Wednesday” (Reuters), “Four U.S. Marines were killed in the past 48 hours in Iraq, the military said, as President George W. Bush weighed sending more troops to quell an uprising that has prompted some nations to pull out civilians working there” (Bloomberg), “A United States helicopter went down yesterday west of Baghdad for the second time in three days, while heavy tank fire punctured a fragile ceasefire maintained by U.S. marines and insurgents in the city of Falluja” (SAPA-AFP), and “US forces tightened their grip around one of Iraq's holiest cities on Wednesday and Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr they have vowed to kill or capture, offered unconditional talks to spare Najaf a bloodbath. Al Sadr had dropped previous conditions for talks with US authorities, his spokesman said. US troops said they had not seen any sign of Sadr's forces backing down” (Daily Times, Pakistan).

By the time the Black Sheep’s Hummer broke down on April 20th, the top war stories were: “Although the U.S. military says there are no serious shortages, the perilous state of Iraq's roads adds to a sense of chaos created by three weeks of Iraqi resistance that has left at least 99 U.S. service members dead, dozens of foreign civilian workers taken hostage and two allies, Spain and Honduras, announcing they will pull their troops out of the country” (LA Times), “Mr. Negroponte [about to be appointed Ambassador to Iraq], 64, has a reputation as a hardened diplomat who attracted considerable controversy as the US ambassador to Honduras in the early Eighties when he was instrumental in assisting the Contras overthrow a leftist regime in Nicaragua. He has always denied allegations that he turned a blind eye to human rights violations, including death squads, in the region in that period” (Independent).

The political pressure to find and publish good news about the GWOT was as intense as the Southwest Asian sun. Kauzlarich had that intensity blazing onto the back of his neck when the report came that the Black Sheep had a broken vehicle. He surely looked at the map, noting that in straight-line distance 2nd Platoon was only a few kilometers from their next objective on his mission checklist… his progress checklist: Manah, a small town in a bowl-like valley. Second Platoon now became a unit to watch, so he probably mentioned it to his S-3, the Operations Officer. Watch them. Make sure they hit their mission times. The S-3 then calls the A Company Commander, Captain Saunders. The old man wants to be reassured that that platoon doesn’t miss its time-on-target. The Company Commander then talks with his Executive Officer (XO) – the make it happen guy. You make sure whatever happens there are boots on the ground in Manah before the sun rises on the 22nd. Yes sir.

First Lieutenant David Uthlaut gets a radio call with a gentle reminder. Don’t miss any TOTs. Uthlaut tells the XO, the mechanic looked at this vehicle and says we need a fuel pump. (This is conjectural.)

No sweat.

At 3 AM (Local), April 22, 2004, a resupply helicopter, with Captains Saunders (the A CO Commander) and Dennis (the A CO XO) on board, dropped off a new fuel pump. They are there to tell Uthlaut personally, the old man (Kauzlarich) is adamant – no more goddamn delays. When the dawn breaks (4:12 AM,
Local), the mechanic begins installing the new fuel pump. Based on his belief that the vehicle will be fixed, 1LT Uthlaut began tweaking his planning and preparation for the mission to Manah. The platoon-plus was 35 Rangers, four allied Afghan Militia Forces, and an interpreter. They had eleven vehicles: four gun-mounted Hummers, two cargo Hummers, one command Hummer, and four Afghan Militia vehicles. (There is a contradiction in the reports on the vehicle numbers. This number was taken from the investigation diagram given in a Powerpoint presentation at 75th Ranger Regimental Headquarters. Section IV of the second investigation (overseen by LTC Kauzlarich) states that there were only nine vehicles.)

The mechanic approached Uthlaut with bad news. The fuel pump had not repaired the vehicle, which now appeared to have very serious suspension problems. It was only 6 AM and there still was plenty of time to do something with this vehicle and make to Manah (Zone 26A, on the Objective checklist) today. The deadlined Hummer was attached to another Hummer with canvas tow straps, and the platoon moved out. At this point, the platoon was generally organized according to its “organic” squads. There were attachments from the Weapons Platoon – two snipers, an AT-4 anti-armor crew, an 81 mm mortar crew, and a 60mm mortar crew.

At 8:44 AM, Local, 1LT Uthlaut called the TOC to request a wrecker for the deadlined Hummer. The tow strap method was failing because one side of the downed vehicle had the wheel wells rubbing the tires. The steering box was broken, too. The vehicle had a .50 caliber machine gun with a shielded swivel mount bolted into the frame of the vehicle, so abandoning the vehicle was not an option they then considered. No one wanted to leave anything that they might end up seeing the wrong side of later.

The wrecker request was refused. The platoon limped to a nearby town named Magara with their albatross Hummer. From around 10:15 AM until 11:30 AM, while the sun got higher and the platoon simmered in static perimeter security positions on the dusty streets, Uthlaut and his Platoon Sergeant, Sergeant First Class Godek, discussed various courses of action while they waited for word from the TOC on their wrecker. Battalion Command Sergeant Major Birch, who had come along to observe the mission, probably participated in those conversations, too.

The troops were, by then, tired, bored, and getting testy. Sitting in one place too long gives troops a chance to think; but the thinking that happens is a muddle of homesickness they can’t display, fantasizing about some kind of action to break up the boredom, and growing hostility toward a chain of command that has quit telling them what the hell is going on. This frame of mind among young Rangers is a very dangerous thing. A desire to strike out at something grows like the yolk in a materializing egg at the center of their frustration.

By then, LTC Kauzlarich had probably become increasingly and uncomfortably aware that he might be forced to report a late time-on-target to his equally urgent bosses at HQ, Task Force Red (Bagram), and HQ, Task Force Omaha (Special Operations Command Central, or SOCCENT), Colonel Jesse Johnson.

At around 11:30 (11:27 Local according to the record), 1LT Uthlaut requested a CH-47 cargo helicopter extraction for the disabled vehicle. The platoon continued to sit idle – on pro forma security – in Magara for almost four more hours, before Central Joint Task Force-180 (CJTF-180) called back to deny the request for a helicopter to sling-load the broken Hummer. No CH-47s would be available for at least three days.

CSM Birch went quietly up to the Platoon Leader and suggested that they had been in this town a very long time… it might be time to figure out how to leave. The Afghan mountain grapevine would surely be carrying the news to unfriendly forces that there was a light American infantry unit stalled around a broken vehicle in Magara.

Now the TOC in Khoust, in particular Cross Commander Kauzlarich, became temperamentally about the likelihood that the Black Sheep would miss their OBJ time. When Uthlaut answered his next radio call, it was irate:

“...we had better not have any more delays due to this vehicle.”

This ominous message was delivered (as best we can tell from inferring between redactions) from Captain Saunders, and other documents explicitly state that this “concern” trickled down from Kauzlarich, through his S-3, and to the A Company Commander. This is a pivotal moment in a dark fate that day, and a pivotal point in our analysis of how Pat Tillman died. For those reasons, I want to reiterate for emphasis: While there was nothing tactically critical about arriving in Manah on any deadline – after all, this was a mission with only broad objectives – the urgency to “show progress” from the top had created an urgency to send in completed Objective checklists from Tactical Operations Centers, and that “false sense of urgency” (the words of the third investigator, Brigadier General Gary Jones) was passed from the TOC to 1LT Uthlaut, who was now being compelled to arrive outside Manah that very day. This rush, and the directed course of action from the TOC, under the command of LTC Kauzlarich, led in a direct and demonstrable way to the loss of command and control (for which Uthlaut would be reprimanded) that resulted in the death of two men.

The directive to Uthlaut was (this was the actual message): “1) let me know when you SP [take off] with the Jinga and broken vehicle; 2) send one section along with both mortars vehicles back to the link-up point. Both mortar vehicles, the 81 tubes, the mortar personnel along with the Snipers need to come back to Khoust, so send them with the broken vehicle. Keep the 60 mortar section with you; 3) send one section into your next objective area to start clearing. The escort section will meet you in the zone after they drop off the broken vehicle.”

Uthlaut protested vehemently.

SPLITTING UP – THE FATAL MISTAKE

Splitting his unit would compromise his ability to maintain command, communications, and control (exactly what would happen). His XO, Captain Dennis, had this argument with Uthlaut on the radio. Uthlaut, as the junior officer, lost this argument even after citing that this violated their Standing Operating Procedures – to clear villages in the daylight and to travel at night. The directive was the opposite. They would travel in day-
light and arrive in Manah by nightfall – or else – and they would conduct the CZ in hours of darkness.

It was already 4:15 PM by then. To comply with his directive, he would have to initiate movement as soon as possible, and they still had the broken vehicle. They had hired a local jinga truck driver to tow the broken vehicle with his old, converted Penske truck.

Uthlaut gave an extremely abbreviated order.

From the summary of the third investigation:

ILT Uthlaut, understanding but not agreeing with his orders, commenced hasty TLPs [troop leading procedures] in preparation for the movement. In essence, the Platoon would move in two Serials – Serial 1 would consist of 16 Rangers and four AMF Soldiers moving in six vehicles (one GMV, one M-1114 armored-up vehicle, and four NSVTs) and Serial 2 would consist of 19 Rangers and two local nationals moving in five vehicles (two GMVs, two M1097A2 cargo vehicles, and the jinga truck towing the NMC GMV). The two Serials would conduct movement on two separate routes – Serial 1 on a northwestern route (Margarah to Manah) [spellings vary] and Serial 2 on a northern route (Margarah to Tit to Afzal Kheyel to Ragay).

Uthlaut now had multiple intermediate missions to organize within minutes. He had to get the Albatross Hummer to the road for pick-up by a recovery vehicle. He had to get a number of personnel to the same pick-up point so they could be returned to Khout. He had to figure out when and where his second “Serial” would link up with his first. He had to ensure that each Serial had the right mix of weapons systems to most effectively defend itself in the event of attack. He had to establish a vehicle drop-off point (VDO) which would double as an objective rally point (ORP – the last covered position prior to entering an objective). And he had to conduct the CZ at Manah.

This forced him to “task organize.”

What this means is the “organic” structure of the platoon, its normal organization into squads, and squads into teams, would be broken up in order to meet the exigencies of a special circumstance. This is not unusual. For example, if a platoon were given an ambush mission, it would likely task organize into security, support, assault, and command elements that would mix and match weapons and lines of command and communication. But when task organization is conducted for an ambush, or a raid, or a reconnaissance, it is usually followed by a planning sequence wherein two-thirds of the time allocated for preparation is set aside for detailed orders and-or extensive “brief-backs” and rehearsals. This gives everyone in the unit an opportunity to work out the kinks and misunderstandings that inevitably occur when people are assigned to different bosses arranged in different structures.

David Uthlaut was directed to do this in mere minutes. So there was an unfamiliar and unrehearsed task organization; there was an operation directed outside a standing operating procedure (SOP) – movement during daylight; and there was the splitting of elements. All these operational anomalies were the direct result of a “false sense of urgency” created by pressure to arrive in Manah by an artificial and tactically non-critical deadline and politically-motivated pressure from the National Command Authority to “show progress” in order to ameliorate the bad publicity associated with the war in Iraq... a war Past Tillman himself had ironically declared to his associates was “so fucking illegal.”

The hasty plan was for Serial 2 to take the first major bifurcation in the road to Manah to the right, instead of the left, in order to catch the main road for the recovery vehicle. Serial 1 would go left, directly through a canyon. None of them had been in this zone before, and their references were 1/50,000 UTM (Universal Transverse Mercator) topographical maps with some very old road data. The region was so mountainous that the 20-meter contour intervals on those maps were often so close together they looked like broad brown stripes drifting through a hallucinogenic Mandelbrot design of brown lines representing the elevation and relief of the terrain of Paktia Province. Even experienced map readers have to pay close attention to these maps. They are very accurate in some respects, but they communicate in three dimensions and require study and the application of an active spatial-conversion intuition.

To actually navigate with these maps requires frequent map checks that associate the graphics with actual terrain, then the translation of this information into some linear set of actions, e.g., head down this road until you see three high peaks to the left-front and a plateau on the right. Then look for the road on the left 300 meters along. This is often a kind of halting, trial-and-error, recalibrating process.

That is what happened when Serial 1 missed their left turn coming out of the canyon to Manah. No doubt, edgy from the directive to travel in broad daylight after having spent hours in a nearby town here in a Taliban stronghold, they breathed a sigh of relief at exiting the canyon and gave the vehicles a little more gas. Then a map check alerted David Uthlaut that they may have missed their turn, and that they were practically on top of their most likely VDO/ORP. He slowed the convoy down while he consulted his map.

There were five adobe-like residences near the missed junction. A handful of older men and children were outside. There were presumably women there, inside the adobe huts. Uthlaut was growing concerned by then. He was not able to establish communication with Serial 1 via the normal FM channels. The mountainous terrain was interrupting the signal. Meanwhile, Serial 2 had departed Magara minutes after Serial 1. It is important to note that the distance from Magara to Manah is – as the crow flies – around 2 miles. Our spatial understanding of two miles in the industrialized metropoles of the world is not the same as the reality of 2 miles in a place like the Spera District of Paktia Province in Afghanistan. Relatively short map distances in terrain this rough, especially when people are obliged to baby motor vehicles over the axle-smashing stones and potholes of the primitive un-maintained roads, are not measured in distance, but in time.

It is quite likely that the two Serials themselves were never more than 800 meters apart. Some members of Serial 2, prior to reversing course at the behest of the jinga driver, could see the tail end of Serial 1 disappear into the canyon.
A simple Physical Combat Proficiency Test in the Army involves a two-mile run. When I was 43 years old, I covered that distance in less than 13 minutes. In 13 minutes, a motorized convoy on the back roads of Spera, with a jinga towing a broken Hummer, might cover 500 meters… probably less.

By the time Serial 2 was forced to turn about on the road to Khatin Khel, Serial 1 was almost exiting the fated canyon. As the convoy began up the steep right fork toward Afdzalkhel, the jinga truck driver became agitated and told the Ranger in his truck through the interpreter (also on board) to have the convoy stop. The Ranger called ahead and stopped the convoy, and after a few minutes, using an interpreter, CSM Birch and SFG Godek learned that the road was too rough for the old Penske truck to use as it dragged the Albatross behind it. They consulted with the driver, and he said the only way he could go was through the same canyon taken by Serial 1.

Godek was concerned that there was no FM communications with Uthlaut as well. Communications between elements is one of the things platoon leaders and platoon sergeants get paid to worry about.

Since the jinga truck with the Albatross in tow was the slowest of the vehicles, it was placed at the front of the queue. The platoon had been in Magara for hours, and the word of the Americans’ presence as well as their destination – Manah – had traveled over the mountain grapevine. A handful of local guerrillas – my estimate is around three – with a Kalashnikov rifles and a Soviet-made rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG) with a few rounds decided to conduct a hasty harassment ambush of the convoy.

One of the Rangers would later report in his statements that a resident of Magara seemed to try to warn them about something while they languished there for almost six hours, but that the planning pressure and glitches had left Godek impatient – remarking that they couldn’t respond to every approach by a strange “indij” or they’d never get anywhere.

This is a very typical operation for guerrillas encountering a target of opportunity. Catch the enemy in a place where they have little freedom to maneuver and you have superior mobility; let off a few rounds at them from well-covered positions; then leave before they’ve had the opportunity to call in air strikes or reinforcements.

This small team of Afghan guerrillas waited in the vicinity of the Khatin Khel junction to see which way the Americans would go. They realized that the element was split when one group left Magara without the other; and they decided to attack the convoy that was debilitated by the towed vehicle. They probably realized when the second convoy stopped at the junction that the jinga with the Albatross would be obliged to travel through the canyon.

This last minute change was not briefed to every member of the convoy, again out of time pressure, even though a cardinal rule in the Rangers is to inform every member of every element of every change. One reason for this rule is that troops who don’t know what they are doing cannot carry on a mission if their leaders are incapacitated and – just as importantly – it is very bad for morale. No doubt, this change was met with a grumbling chorus through the ranks of “What the fuck now?”

On foot, atop the ridges along either side of the canyon, two guerrillas on the northern ridgeline and one on the southern (with the RPG), moving effortlessly along familiar footpaths, they paralleled the movement of Serial 2. Within minutes, the convoy encountered the tightest chokepoint in the canyon – one later described by a member of Serial 2: “About 300 meters into the draw, the terrain became… severely restricted with only inches on either side of the vehicle.”

The guerrilla on the southern ridgeline pointed his RPG into the canyon and fired one of the high-explosive rounds. (I infer this because the first explosive impact was against the wall of the northern ridgeline.) And RPG is a short-range anti-vehicle weapon with a maximum effective range of around 200 meters and a flight range (on flat ground) of around 700 meters. This means that one can fire it as far as 700 meters, but the consistency and accuracy of the round after 200 meters is rapidly degraded.

The guerrillas were over the crest of the ridges, more than 500 meters away, so they could pop away at the American convoy with little danger to themselves. A couple of steps back and they could put an entire mountain between themselves and the direct fire of the Americans. By the same token, they were not themselves within range to conduct anything more respectable as an ambush than plain harassment.

The RPG round – which is a shape-charge designed to penetrate light armor on vehicles and send a lethal over-pressured fireball into the interior of the target – crashed into the side of the canyon above the jinga truck, and sent a small avalanche of rocks raining down around the front of the convoy.

The story that this was a mortar is part of the construction of a “well-armed guerrilla contingent” that didn’t exist. Mortars are indirect fire weapons. They fire into the air and arc into a target from above. They cannot be fired from high ground into a canyon where they smash into the side of the canyon wall.

There is a popping sound from an RPG when it launches, and other than that there is no real “signature” until the round impacts and explodes – which it does with jolting force. The diesel engines were growling away inside the amplifying canyon and no one heard the launch that was 500 meters away and well above them. The first impression was that the jinga has encountered an improvised explosive device (IED), the term now used to describe a mechanical ambush.

**FOLLOWING ORDERS**

So the Serial did what they were trained to do in the event of an IED. They dismounted and established “360” security… as best they could given that the canyon effectively placed them inside a tube.

Serial 1 – where Pat Tillman was – heard the explosion, too. They stopped and tried again to establish communica-
tions. Pat had to have thought about his brother, Kevin, who was with Serial 2. Pat probably became more than a little agitated to figure out what was happening and to do something, anything, about it.

Serial 2 members had to shout out a warning at the jinga driver and one of their own vehicles. Rocks were falling near them. SFC Godek was moving up toward the front to see what had happened, when one of the guerrillas on the northern ridge pushed his selector switch on his Kalashnikov to auto and sprayed a burst into the canyon. This was from double the maximum effective range of the Russian assault rifle; so these rounds hit nothing but rock and dirt, but made snapping sounds and ricochets whines inside the canyon, alerting Serial 2 that they were actually inside an ambush.

Two more RPG rounds were fired, again causing a rain of rocks but no damage or casualties.

An ambush is defined as “a surprise attack from a concealed position on a moving or temporarily halted target.” While this met the definition of an ambush, it is important to reiterate that there are huge differences between the efficacies of ambushes, and along that continuum, this was near the ineffective end – unless the fratricide as a result is counted as part of it. Not a single person or vehicle – in was ever hit or damaged from the fires off the ridgelines.

This report will note more than once how subsequent accounts of the firefight on April 22nd will overstate the intensity of this so-called battle. This was necessary, first, to create the pretext for the award of a Silver Star to Pat Tillman (again, this is not to say that Pat’s actions were anything but courageous) as part of a larger Pentagon docudrama script to stand in for the reality of the incident, and second, to portray the conditions of the firefight as sufficiently confusing to excuse violations of the ROE, violations of Geneva, and the initial recommendation to prosecute for negligent homicide.

When Serial 2 realized they were being fired upon, and someone claimed they saw muzzle flashes from the northern ridgeline, these frustrated, irritable Rangers, in the Ranger culture that teaches young men to crave combat almost as a rite of passage, found a real live target for both their ambitions and their frustration. They released an ungodly volume of fire at the top of the ridgelines, and he even ordered one shot (which made absolutely no tactical sense) from the formidable AT-4 shoulder-fired antitank rocket launcher… which certainly launched straight over the heads of the guerrillas to land at random in the far valley, or splash harmlessly against the visible wall of the ridge.

During this so-called firefight, the sound of which had put Serial 1 into motion toward the small village and the canyon to render assistance – suspecting rightly that Serial 2 was in contact – there was actually an argument. The jinga driver had dismounted when they thought it was an IED, and now the jinga blocked the whole convoy that wasn’t particularly keen to stay in the canyon while insurgents plinked at them over the lip of the mountain. When the jinga driver didn’t get the truck moving fast enough, one frustrated Ranger smashed his windshield. The jinga truck driver protested and a shouting match began in two languages that an NCO had to break up.

Does this wound like a withering ambush?

General Gary Jones questioning SSG Jackson (Pat’s organic squad leader, who was with Serial 2):

Q: How did the ambush commence?
A: The ambush commenced with mortar rounds [sic] and small arms fire.

Q: What types of fires were you receiving?
A: The fires were ineffective. They weren’t very accurate.

From the time of the first RPG exploding until Pat Tillman was killed and the shooting stopped was 14 minutes. As a thought experiment, I’ll ask readers to look at their watches now and sit still quietly for 14 minutes. Imagine now that you are in a firefight for that entire time and not a single person or vehicle, canalized inside a canyon, is even hit. If there was a fog of war in Spera District that day, it was not the fog of intense conflict but the fog of frustrated aggression on the part of the Rangers, at the end of a long day, and looking forward to an equally long night.

One Ranger, in his sworn statement, when asked why he fired with such intensity at the position where Pat Tillman was, said, “I wanted to be in a firefight.” The merit badge of the infantry.

The jinga pulled forward enough to push over to the right side of the road and permit one of the Serial 2 vehicles to get past. SSG Baker, the supervisor aboard this vehicle, told his driver SGT Sayer “to punch it.” Baker dismounted behind the jinga, ran forward and ordered the jinga driver and the interpreter aboard, then rode their truck while they moved forward. The Rangers were still blasting away at the ridgeline. Then the enemy RPG gunner from the southern ridgeline engaged with a couple of bursts into the canyon, provoking an even more intense response from the Rangers. SSG Baker notes that he ran out of ammunition here and dismounted the jinga to return to his vehicle that trailed directly behind it.

Baker was now wound up. Being in the front, he felt it was his responsibility to get the Serial “broken out” of the canyon. The Rangers were feeding off one another’s fires, plugging into the rush of all that noise, that luminous element of danger. Their aggression now had an outlet. Baker had his M-203 grenadier start firing 40mm grenades over the ridges, and he even ordered one shot (which made absolutely no tactical sense) from the formidable AT-4 shoulder-fired antitank rocket launcher… which certainly launched straight over the heads of the guerrillas to land at random in the far valley, or splash harmlessly against the visible wall of the ridge.

The Rangers’ 60mm mortar fired two rounds, one landing near a Serial 1 position.

The jinga driver found a wider spot and pulled to the right to stop. Baker whipped around him with his Hummer. Aboard Baker’s vehicle were Steven Ashpool, wielding the cumbersome M-2.50 caliber machinegun; Steven Elliot, with the portable M-240 machinegun; Trevor Alders, with the squad automatic
Baker’s Hummer was approaching the mouth of the canyon. Steven Elliot, being questioned by General Gary Jones:

Q: What were the light conditions like?
A: The light was not ideal. I could clearly see once we left the canyon area. In the canyon, the light conditions were poor. The whole time I could only make out shapes and shadows. (emphasis added)

Q: Was this your first firefight?
A: Yes.

Q: Why did you fire at shapes on the western ridgeline?
A: I was excited… [not afraid… excited -SG]

Q: At this point in time, were you taking enemy fires?
A: Our GMV [vehicle] never took any rounds. We weren’t taking immediate fires. (emphasis added)

The aggression that was finding its catharsis with Serial 2 was mirrored by real anxiety on the part of Serial 1. 1LT Uthlaut did not know what was going on; he could only hear the terrible volume of fire, not knowing that 99% of it was from Rangers. He could see trackers streaking up out of the canyon. SSG Weeks could probably not have restrained Pat if he’d wanted to. Pat’s brother was in there. Uthlaut ordered Jade Lane, his radiotelephone operator (RTO) to try satellite communications to overcome the commo void created by the mountains for FM. He told Weeks to move out and provide cover for Serial 1 if that’s who was in there.

Weeks took Pat, one Afghan militiaman, Brian O’Neal (a new Ranger), and two other Rangers (we do not have their names) with him, and began mounting a small spur west of the road. This spur led up the side of the ridgeline along the right side of Serial 2.

By this was when the jinga truck had advanced far enough to allow room for SSG Baker’s vehicle to pass it. Baker did not know that around the next bend was the mouth of the canyon, nor did he realize – because no communications had been possible over the tactical FM radio sets, exactly as 1LT Uthlaut had feared – that Serial 1 had passed their turn and were just ahead of them.

The two enemy militiamen on the north slope and the one with the RPG and Kalashnikov on the southern slope had been advancing to within view of the lead end of the channelized convoy, firing into the canyon, then retreating behind the crest of the ridge and advancing parallel to Serial 2. Baker had his vehicle’s weapons spraying both ridgelines to suppress enemy fires. The Afghan enemy combatant on the south side of the ridge flashed into view of the AMF with Pat Tillman and Weeks’ element, just as the two enemy combatants chasing the north ride came within sight of Weeks. The entire element hit the dirt as the north-ridge combatants snapped a few rounds at them then fled. The AMF pointed to the far ridge where he had caught a glimpse of the south-ridge RPG gunner. Pat asked Weeks if he could advance across the road with O’Neal and the AMF to close with whatever enemy element was on the south-ridge. Pat wanted to drop his heavy body armor in order to move with greater speed and agility. Weeks denied the request to drop armor, but granted the request to cross the road.

There was an explosion up the spur from their position, which would later be called an enemy mortar. In fact, in all likelihood, it was a 60mm Ranger mortar, one of the 40mm grenades, or the AT-4 round. The bends in the road at one point caused Serial 2’s suppressive fires to arc directly over Serial 1.

Pat Tillman, Brian O’Neal, and the AMF scrambled down the spur to a cluster of boulders, when the AMF took cover and began firing at the point along the southern ridge where he had caught his glimpse of the RPG gunner. Pat oriented on the direction of his fires and began firing himself. The enemy combatants, three to four of them, recognized that they were losing their terrain advantage and running headlong into a superior force with space to maneuver, and they broke contact.

The firefight was over, but none of the Rangers could know that. Baker’s vehicle, which had been firing up at the lateral ridgelines, saw the canyon open up, and a small village came into view. They were pumped up from firing, and the .50 cal gunner swung forward and began hosing down the village, which was where Uthlaut and his element were. The whole vehicle opened up as the Hummer advanced.

Uthlaut and Lane were both wounded, and it took them a few moments to realize that they were looking at a Serial 2 vehicle that was firing at them.

**BLOODLETTING**

In the same instant that Baker’s vehicle opened up on the village, they came within a few meters of a six-foot rock retaining wall on their right, and over the top of the wall Baker spotted muzzle flashes. They were those of the AMF and Pat Tillman, and they were very, very near… around 60 meters away. (The changed statements for the second investigation would vary from claiming 100-200 meters.)

“Contact at three o’clock!” Baker screamed, and the entire vehicle swung its blazing automatic weapons, with the wavering heat mirage drifting off the overheated barrels, to the right. The vehicle rolled to a stop for an instant.

Weeks’ element and Pat’s element dropped in deep behind the cover of the rocks as this immense volume of fire chewed up the ground around them, with its lethal stacatto of supersonic cracks and the sparks of shattering rock and the burning balls of grounded tracer ammunition.

Pat, Weeks, and O’Neal were screaming, “Cease fire! Friendlies!” at the top of their lungs. The AMF lay in a pool of blood, cut down in the hail of fire. Pat took a white-smoke grenade off of his load-carrying equipment and pulled the pin, tossing it in front of their position in the hope that it would signal to Baker’s vehicle that they were making a terrible mistake.
The firing into Pat’s position had been going on for mere seconds by then.

There is a space of time between the instant one commits to action and time required to assess the results of an action—especially in dynamic situations. In an action such as firing a weapon in combat, even one that was—until Serial 2’s vehicle opened upon its own troops—comparatively minor, that exercise of intent becomes a process in motion, and the period of time between observing a change in the situation and realizing the significance of what one observes is not unlike the lag in time between looking up from ones dashboard to the road ahead and realizing that a deer is crossing your path…and the actual application of one’s brakes.

In combat situations, especially those where one is dominating, there is what might be termed an intention-action cycle, a kind of skip in the record, where one does the same thing over and over with a minimal cue. It is comparable to a boxer whose opponent is on the ropes, and the dominant pugilist then rains blows on his weakened opponent… no longer in what is called the OODA decision-cycle: observe, orient, decide, act… observe, orient, etc. In earlier stages, he threw a combination, then observed the result, re-oriented, decided on a next move, then took action. With the opponent weakened and on the ropes, the dominant fighter drops into an intention-action cycle of punch, punch, punch, punch… with nothing except a series of targets on the opponent’s body as the cue.

This was the psychology of Baker’s vehicle when they exited the canyon at dusk on April 22, 2004. They were simply firing at multiple points that stood out on the terrain. This is sometimes called “tunnel-vision,” and it is very common. It is a state of ultra-aggression, hat if given free reign, over-rides one’s critical faculties. Leaders who allow their troops to “go there,” are setting up a situation where processes that depend on judgment—like observation of the rules of the Geneva Conventions that prohibit firing into villages from where there is no observable threat, like rules of engagement (ROE) that require positive identification (PID) of a person as friend or foe before firing at them—are mooted.

This is why a standing operating procedure (SOP) that states subordinates are supposed to orient their fires on those of the leader is potentially at odds with ROE and Geneva. The Rangers in Baker’s vehicle were following the SOP at odds with the ROE and Geneva. They were in a psycho-physiological intention-action cycle, at the end of a long, frustrating day.

When Baker’s view of the rocks where they were firing was obscured by white smoke, he had his vehicle pull forward to regain view of the rocks. This move took almost four seconds by the best accounts.

Someone was yelling “friendlies” from within the vehicle, but the sound was amid a cacophony of yelling which did nor indicate where the friendlies were, and sounded far away as if in a distant hollow room, because the whole crew was partially deafened by the resonating gunfire that had assaulted their tympanic membranes inside the canyon. This sound was something that was still outside the intention-action cycle of shoot, shoot, shoot, shoot.

In that space of that four second lull in fire, Pat Tillman and O’Neal, deeply relieved that the smoke had alerted Baker’s vehicle to their presence, had stood and waved their arms over their heads to confirm their position.

Later statements would make contradictory claims about who saw what, when… about what was and was not recognizable… about light conditions and distances. Those statements were not the original statements, which were lost with Captain Richard Scott’s report, and altered, by Scott’s own account in a subsequent interview with General Gary Jones. The statements that survived, the altered statements that were signed on May 12th, replaced those taken during the last week of April when Scott had collected his more vivid and accurate accounts – accounts that people did not then know would implicate members of the Forward Operating Base (FOB) chain of command in the “false sense of urgency,” and accounts that people did not then know would lead to recommendations for action commensurate with criminally negligent homicide. The surviving statements, wherein LTC Kauzlarich, FOB Cross Commander, illegally cancelled and disappeared the results of an Article 15-6 investigation and replaced it with one under his own direct supervision—even though he was himself directly implicated in “creating the false sense of urgency” and accounts that people did not then know would lead to recommendations for action commensurate with criminally negligent homicide. The surviving statements altered the distances and changed the lighting conditions and made contradictory claims about who saw what, when, in very specific ways that would exonerate very specific people from charges of everything from poor leadership to negligent homicide.

The personnel aboard Baker’s Hummer saw Pat Tillman and Brian O’Neal at less than 40 meters away with their distinctive US battle-rattle silhouettes, with very adequate light at a few minutes after sunset, waving like they were doing jumping jacks. But their brains were not engaged for a critical evaluation. They were outside the ROE, outside Geneva, and outside the mind-set of positive identification (PID).

**PUNCH, PUNCH, PUNCH**

When the vehicle made that stop, four seconds ahead of their last stop, they were still programmed to punch, punch, punch, punch. They were so into it that O’Neal would later testify that two of them actually dismounted the vehicle, further contributing to Tillman and O’Neal’s impression that they may have been killed. But at the end of this move, as this two or three members of Baker’s vehicle actually dismounted and advanced a short distance toward Pat’s position, they leveled their weapons at the human forms and began punching rounds into them as fast as they could hit the trigger and realign the sights.

There was a moment of disbelief on the part of Pat Tillman and Brian O’Neal. Then Pat saved Brian’s life. He pushed O’Neal back behind the rocks. But before he could himself take cover, he had been hit. The order of impact will never be known. In
the hail of fire that was punctuated by tracers chattering through
the lethal cone of high-velocity projectiles, stones were thrown at
high enough speed to wound Pat in the wrist and leg. It is also
know that SAW ammunition hit the body armor that covered his
chest and abdomen.

He managed, in his last moments, to shout, “I’m Pat fucking
Tillman, damnit!” Then the impact of the rounds drove him
down, where he said something to Brian O’Neal. O’Neal would
say that by now there was pain in his voice. Then, with the pas-
motion of the body of this gifted athlete being shifted by the
impact of high-powered ammunition, his head moved while three
rounds of either M240 or SAW ammunition, or both, hit him in
the head. His lifeless form dropped alongside O’Neal and the
body of the AMF.
Time goes in one direction only. There are no take-backs.
NEXT: The Emergencies – The Pat Tillman story is far from
over.

(continued from page 2)

There was a gruesome irony in the name of the plateau upon
which the base was built: The Arena of the Gods. The French
did indeed think themselves almost Gods in this land. Three
years ago, empowered by the attacks of 9-11, the Bush White
House and all its advisors displayed the arrogance of Caligulan
deities.

With each day that passed prior to the battle, Navarre and his
commanders grew more confident in their own conclusions. He
never surmised that under cover of darkness and tropical canopy,
tens of thousands of civilian- auxiliary porters and soldiers were
hauling in thousands of tons of tools, weapons, rice, and ammu-
nition, digging hundreds of camouflaged caves into the mountain
slopes facing the French base, and dragging artillery pieces up
mountainsides with ropes and muscle.

Navarre was blessed with the cream of French fighting forces –
battle-scarred veterans of many engagements, including his offi-
cers – fleshed out with foreign allied troops to 14,000 strong, and
supplied with massive American logistical assistance.
Then the battle was engaged.
Over the next 55 days, there was a long period of French confi-
dence, even with the surprising force of the assault and the
dreadful casualties. But during that time, Giap had determined
on a new tactic. Rather than a final frontal attack over ground,
the Vietminh soldiers slung their Kalashnikovs and seized their
shovels. They began entrenching their way in through the con-
centric French defense perimeters, patiently and arduously dig-
ging like moles, centimeter my centimeter, from the outside in,
deep enough to use the trenches as both supply lines and protec-
tion from the incessant French artillery, mortars, and aerial straf-
ing.

No doubt on the 50th day, there was still hope within the bloody
French camp that the Vietminh would run out of ammunition,
that some key leader would be killed in the cannon duels, that
some miracle would erase the evidence growing before them that
they would go down in defeat. And no doubt, there were a few
Vietminh among these tough and relentless anti-colonial troops
who felt a pang of doubt by Day 54 about how long this fight had
gone on… the sneaking suspicion that the French might actually
be invincible.

But the tipping point had been nearly reached by the time the
battle was prepared, and Giap’s decision to go for the slow, sys-
tematic approach of the trenches – along with that revolutionary
faith that had already determined never to quit – was the decision
that made the French defeat inevitable.
The Bush administration is surely looking around and seeing the
encroachment of trenches now. Navarre, it must be said, at least
had the advantage of knowing who was and was not the en-
emy. Some of the trenches inching in toward the Bush adminis-
tration’s central perimeter are being constructed by former al-
lies.

Navarre was a real general, with a real military career, and real
combat experience. Bush is a guy who likes to dress up like a
fighter pilot, and make manly faces at interviewers when he says
things like, “I am a war president.”
Bush and Navarre shared the fatal flaw of racist arrogance, which
led them both to face the patient fury of the tough brown people
they held in Eurocentric contempt.

But Bush – who said the best event of his presidency was catch-
ing a “seven-and-a-half pound perch in my lake” [in Crawford,
Texas… this would have exceeded the record perch recorded
cought, in New Jersey, which is four pounds] – who wants to be
a fighter pilot but has an aversion to both discipline and combat,
who wants to be a cowboy but reportedly has a phobia about
horses, who cannot differentiate between reality and play-acting,
was easy prey for the most grandiose faction in the Republican
Party leadership: the cosmic think-tankers of the imaginary New
Rome. They promised him – especially after September 11th,
when they were writhing in ecstatic paroxysms of martial fantasy
– that he could be “a war president,” a generalissimo, the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the victorious armed forces that would
launch The New… American… Century.

The New Centurions

The Bush administration saw 9-11 as its opportunity to fast for-
ward its New American Century hallucination. As we watch
now with fascinated horror, this administration, in spite of disin-
tegration by comeuppance, continues to pile up bodies as the
price of its existence.

The Bush entourage was well on its way to the political construc-
The invasion of Afghanistan – already planned – was not merely
swift. It was still riding the giant wave of collective shock and
anger emanating from the crushing collapse of the World Trade
Center. It was a juggernaut, and the speed with which the Talib-
ban government came apart in the face of the invasion gave the
public and the New American Centurions just the right cathartic
combination of vengeance and exhibition of power.

The public was satisfied that the attacks of September had not
gone unanswered.
The Centurion administration was reinforced in a sense of its own invincibility.

And so they built their new political fortress with money. They knocked it together with American orientalism and imperial hubris. They never suspected that the enemies in the thickly foli-ated surrounding hills would dare move against them.

There was always a real crisis. The neocons recognize it. So do the “realists,” Republican and Democrat. The imperial center’s foundation is eroding, and it now rests atop an increasingly contradictory and disarticulated set of supports. The Centurions – correctly – identified the looming world energy crisis as determinative of any future.

Cheney’s first act as shadow-president was to pull together an energy Star Chamber; and the Centurions always saw militarization of both foreign and domestic policy as their methodological solution. It was their eagerness to exploit the September of American Dismay as an agenda accelerator – the ideal opportunity to construct the New Enemy, the new Global War on Terror (GWOT) as the basis of that militarization – that led them to their own Arena of the Gods.

It was, is, and will continue to be an Energy War. Energy is the material substrate of power; this is as inescapable – literally – as entropy. The plan was to erect a new network of bases in South-west Asia in the wake of their expulsion from ever more fragile Saudi Arabia, and to use the GWOT as a pretext to develop a new body of law to attack domestic political enemies. The US military’s Cold War disposition was to be decisively abandoned; and the area around the oil-soaked Persian Gulf subjugated within a network of bases… lily pads, they called them. The first obstacle came before they’d even recognized it… from the left. The extreme marginalization of the political left in the United States led the neocons to dismiss it.

The problem was, we did not dismiss ourselves. I myself participated in a teach-in at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, organized on the run by leftist faculty members Catherine Lutz, Rashmi Varma, and elin o’Hara slavick, opposing any attack on Afghanistan.

The teach-in happened on September 17th, and with elin emcee-ing. The teach-in panel consisted of Ariel Dorfman, Catherine Lutz, Rashmi Varma, Rania Masri, William Blum, Charles Kurzman, and me. With less than six days to prepare, around 800 people came, and they heard exactly what they could not have heard on any television station or read in any newspaper… in fact, what many people, intimidated by the aggressively chauvinist atmosphere post-9-11, would hardly speak among themselves – that this administration was using this attack to pursue an agenda, and that history did not begin on September 11th.

These courageous progressive women at UNC made up their minds that if only ten percent of the US population was opposing the war agenda, then someone had to ensure that this ten percent retained a public voice. Within days, the American Council of Trustees and Alumni, a right-wing outfit originally founded in 1995 as the National Alumni Forum by Lynne Cheney (America’s “second lady”) and Connecticut Senator Joseph Lieberman to push the university systems to the right by attacking “political correctness,” issued what was tantamount to a fatwa, an enemies list of public traitors. All of us were placed on it… along with similar activists conducting similar events across the United States.

"We learn from history that when a nation's intellectuals are unwilling to defend its civilization, they give comfort to its adversaries," ACTA said.

The subtext was blazingly clear. We were engaged in trea-son. The neocons were counting on the war frenzy to get the American public so firmly behind their agenda that the rest of us would be intimidated into silence. This was a warning; and it was a warning that the left ignored. I have never been prouder than I was then to be counted among the left; to have been the first speed bump that the Centurions encountered on the way to their Arena of the Gods.

The liberals who exult in the polls showing the administration’s popularity at an all time low now – in some vain hope that an election will put all this unpleasantness behind us – scribbled cautiously back then. They alternated between despair at the good fortune of Republicans and support for Afghan women being “liberated” from the Taliban by American bombs.

The left, on the other hand – that motley, sometimes warring collection of socialists, feminists, anarchists, and anti-imperialists from all over the country that had been continually marginalized – had nothing to lose by telling the truth. And those of us who refused to grant the Centurions our fear embold-ened others to lose theirs.

I haven’t the least doubt that the speed and steadfastness of the left’s response to 9-11 was directly responsible for the eventual speed and strength with which a vigorous mass movement was formed against the war in Iraq. The public was shown that we could get away with it, and then – day-by-day – people began to ask the tough questions that would break ground on the entrench-ments that constitute the siege of the Bush administration today. They were building their new imperial base, but they were already encountering the tripwires. Those with the willingness to fight back demonstrated that people could fight back.

Internationally, of course, the Centurions made the mother of all miscalculations: They believed that the fait accompli of the Iraq occupation would dictate the terms to the rest of the world for all future relations.

The Bush administration is Thespian. They stage manage; they script; they playact.

The defining moment for the New American Century was to be Bush’s triumphal announcement from the Deck of the USS Lin-coln – in a fighter pilot costume, complete with the presidential gonads protruding against tightly cinched leg-straps – that the war was won…and over. Iran would be next, surrounded now from Afghanistan and Iraq. Syria would bend the knee. Saudi Arabia would be safely encircled by US military plat-forms. China would be hemmed in; and the US would be parked on the back porch of Russia. The imperial hand would be firmly on the oil tap.
But the Iraqis hadn’t read the White House script. They fought. The huge American bases were constructed against a storm surge of explosive hostility. The occupiers were driven behind the wire in the Green Zone, where they were forced by the two-front rebellion of 2004 into forging a tactical and political alliance with pro-Iranians.

Then George W. Bush won the Iran-Iraq War… for Iran.

Rather than effect a compliant regime change, American saber rattling provoked a militant nationalism among the Iranians that led to the election of religious conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran’s new president.

Russia and China, neither being rookies in the game of international Realpolitik, effected their own compact centered on the defense of Iran. These two Asiatic giants, each adept at the intricacies of non-linear diplomacy in ways that confuse the uninitiated, were destined to look to one another the moment the Anglo-American ground offensive went north on March 20, 2003. The Bush administration demonstrated its resolve to pursue a new doctrine – preemptive war. There was no longer a question of if Russian and China would bloc against the US. The only questions were when and how.

The answer to that question evolved with the situation, the most elemental aspect of which was the fact that the guerrilla resistance in Iraq began wiping its ass with Rumsfeld’s new military doctrine. The US was pinned down – militarily, politically, diplomatically, and economically. The Bush administration had successfully conducted a coup de main… against itself.

Once it had become apparent by mid-2004 that the US would be forced to grant substantial concessions to the pro-Iranian Iraqis under the influence of Ali al-Sistani, the Bear and the Dragon turned to one another in their mutual understanding of the implication: the US had leapt into quicksand. The time had arrived to form a bloc to challenge the Centurions.

**The Asiatic Bloc**

Jephraim P. Gundzik, writing in *Asia Times* in June 2005, described the emergence of the Russia-China-Iran compact:

> The military implementation of the George W Bush administration's unilateralist foreign policy is creating monumental changes in the world's geostrategic alliances. The most significant of these changes is the formation of a new triangle comprised of China, Iran and Russia.

Growing ties between Moscow and Beijing in the past 18 months is an important geopolitical event that has gone practically unnoticed. China’s premier, Wen Jiabao, visited Russia in September 2004. In October 2004, President Vladimir Putin visited China. During the October meeting, both China and Russia declared that Sino-Russian relations had reached “unparalleled heights”. In addition to settling long-standing border issues, Moscow and Beijing agreed to hold joint military exercises in 2005. This marks the first large-scale military exercises between Russia and China since 1958.

Moscow and Beijing signed massive arms and energy deals. The re-nationalization of energy giant Yukos by Putin’s government – which provoked an avalanche of misinformed speculation in the press – was directly related to Russia’s geo-strategic imperative to consolidate this emerging Sino-Russian bloc. Meanwhile, China’s state-owned Zhuhai Zhenrong penned a contract with Iran for 25-years worth of liquefied natural gas. As Sinopec (the Chinese state-owned oil company) hooked up a $100 billion oil import deal, which included substantial Chinese investment in Iranian oil production infrastructure. Even though this technically violated a US sanction against trading with Iran, the US had to tread lightly and swallow its bile.

F. William Engdahl’s subtly titled article “The US’s geopolitical nightmare,” written for Asia Times on May 9, 2006, noted:

> The problem is that the US economy has become dependent on Chinese trade imports and on Chinese holdings of US Treasury securities. China today is the largest holder of dollar reserves in the form of US Treasury paper worth an estimated US$825 billion. Were Beijing to decide to exit the US bond market, even in part, it would cause a dollar free-fall and collapse of the $7 trillion US real-estate market, a wave of US bank failures, and huge unemployment. It's a real option, even if unlikely at the moment. Russia and China were already both surviving US objections to violations of US sanctions against selling arms technology to Iran. The other thing Russia was selling Tehran was nuclear fuel.

The recent rattling of the US saber, ostensibly threatening a US attack on Iran was clearly aimed at gaining Russia’s and China’s – both members of the UN Security Council – acceptance of anti-Iran sanctions as a lesser-evil option to military action. It did not work; and now the US is “blinking” again, yet another demonstration of US isolation and debility.

Gundzik writes:

> The endorsement of Tehran's nuclear energy program by Moscow and Beijing reveals the primary impetus behind the China-Iran-Russia axis -- to counter US unilateralism and global hegemonic intentions. For Beijing and Moscow, this means minimizing US influence in Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East. For the regime in Tehran, keeping the US at bay is a matter of survival.

The joint statement issued at the conclusion of Putin’s state visit to China in October 2004 was a clear indication of Beijing’s and Moscow’s abhorrence of the Bush administration’s unilateral foreign policy. The statement noted that China and Russia "hold that it is urgently needed to [resolve] international disputes under the chairing of the UN and resolve crisis [sic] on the basis of universally recognized principles of international law. Any coe-
cive action should only be taken with the approval of the UN Security Council and enforced under its supervision..."

Two weeks after this statement was released, and just prior to the US presidential election, Beijing's position against US unilateralism was again made explicit by China's former foreign minister Qian Qichen – arguably China’s most distinguished diplomat. In an opinion piece published in the China Daily, Qian ripped Washington's unilateralism: "The United States has tightened its control of the Middle East, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia." He noted that this control "testifies that Washington's anti-terror campaign has already gone beyond the scope of self defense". Qian went further, stating that: "The US case in Iraq has caused the Muslim world and Arab countries to believe that the superpower already regards them as targets [for] its ambitious democratic reform program."

Since the formation of this Sino-Russian condominium, Iran has placed the US in check within Iraq. The pro-Iranian United Iraqi Alliance dominated elections. Iran has also found a new friend in the region – Turkey – who can help it drive a wedge between the only two armed factions in Iraq that are not openly fighting the Americans: the Sistanist Shias and the Kurds.

[Part-Two of this series will run on Wednesday, June 21, 2006]

Teetering On The Brink

Peak Oil Conference in the Birthplace of Suburbia

by

Michael Kane
Staff Writer


Unfortunately Matt Simmons’ father passed away just a few days before the event so he was unable to attend. FTW sends our condolences to Simmons and his family. But fortunately, Richard Heinberg was able to modify his presentation to include the most important aspects of Peak that Simmons would have otherwise covered.

Joining these Peak Oil experts on the panel were energy industry professionals from the local area including John Hritcko, Jr., Regional Director of Shell Group, Broadwater, which is the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facility proposed for the Long Island Sound; Cynthia M. Crookes, Project Manager of Florida Power and Light (FPL), who has proposed a 40 turbine off-shore wind farm in Long Island waters; and Elizabeth McCarthy, CFO, Long Island Power Authority (LIPA).

James Howard Kunstler and Richard Heinberg on the Q&A panel at NYIT

About 300 people – mostly professionals from the energy industry and academia – filled a quaint, upscale hall known as the De Seversky Center at NYIT. Local news outlets showed up to cover the event – most notably Newsday who based their subsequent report around Richard Heinberg – but none of the major networks was there. The catalyst for this event was when faculty members at NYIT saw the critical Peak Oil documentary, “The End of Suburbia.”

The conference was very well organized, incorporating local issues within a global context. My personal experience at this event further demonstrated why I will not be living on Long Island much longer. As one of the audience members pointed out during the Q&A session, the Peak Oil experts and the energy industry professionals were having a “dialogue to the death.” There was no real exchange happening, and the industry professionals never addressed Peak head-on. Perhaps Matt Simmons could have provided a much-needed bridge between the two if present, but I doubt it.

When James Kunstler said that there isn’t going to be any meaningful change implemented because the American people don’t want real change, this was virtually identical to John Hritcko of Shell saying that we shouldn’t compare our country to Cuba because most Americans don’t “aspire to live the lifestyle” of a Cuban. From opposite ends of the spectrum they came to the same conclusion.

I spoke with Beth Fiteni, a brilliant young woman who works as the Issues Program Director for Neighborhood Network, a local non-profit environmental group. When I told her why I am not a supporter of Big Renewables, such as the wind farm proposed by FPL off the south shore of Long Island, she lectured me on how my voice will not be heard if I take such a rigid stance. I tried to explain why I support small cooperative energy systems almost exclusively, and she didn’t disagree. But her experience has shown her that Long Islanders won’t listen to my approach. She is probably right.
Cynthia Crookes of FPL Energy stated that wind farms are a part of the solution for climate change, and that off-shore is the only place for them on Long Island since we don’t have the available land needed to install wind turbines inland. I questioned both of these assumptions during Q&A. First, I pointed out that a study by scientist David Keith shows if too many wind turbines are installed across the globe this will change global wind patterns and contribute to climate change. Then I noted that inland wind could be implemented on Long Island in small cooperative settings by using smaller turbines, so why isn’t this being encouraged by LIPA?

Crookes said that small cooperatives have been implemented elsewhere, but we are not seeing them here on Long Island. (Elizabeth McCarthy never addressed my question of why LIPA isn’t encouraging small wind cooperatives). And she is certain if too many big wind turbines were turning across the globe they would contribute to climate change, but that is “way off in the future.” She doubts that FPL’s one project of 40 wind turbines is going to cause climate change.

She left out the fact that FPL is the largest generator of wind power in the country, owning 46 wind farms in 15 states with plans for that number to grow ever-upwards. If someone would have argued thirty years ago that burning too many fossil fuels would eventually contribute to climate change, this exact same argument might have been used: “That’s way off in the future.”

Welcome to the future.

It should be noted that in December of 2005, FPL bought Constellation Energy Group for $11 billion to create the largest utility in the country called Constellation Energy. However, this merger is currently held up in the Maryland court system. FTW will address this issue in the near future once the courts make their final ruling.

The privatization of utilities is a frightening trend that FTW addressed back in January when we published a critical report titled THE END of the GRID.

John Hritcko of Shell lost all credibility in my eyes when he answered a question about Peak Oil by quoting Daniel Yergin. Hritcko said we shouldn’t be talking about Peak directly, but what we can do to meet rising energy demand. He admitted LNG is ultimately unsustainable long-term, but that there is plenty of natural gas around the world to keep LNG competitive for a long time. His main concern is competition: Will coal and nuclear end up out-pricing his LNG facility?

This is all a part of the problem, not the solution. Both Hritcko and McCarthy were strongly questioned by Professor Scott Carlin of CW Post who dared them to speak directly to Peak. Hritcko said little more than that we shouldn’t get fixated on the date of Peak, but rather focus on “alternatives” for meeting demand. His preferred “alternatives” are LNG and piped natural gas.

“What is LIPA’s blackout forecast?” demanded Carlin after LIPA’s McCarthy effectively refused to speak directly to Peak. McCarthy responded by saying that there is plenty of energy coming online to meet demand up until 2015.

Great. No need to worry until 2015! I feel better. Don’t you? Long Island’s demand for energy grows by 150 Megawatts (MW) per year. LIPA’s only true concern is to ensure they can fill that demand. No one is interested in addressing the fact that the problem is increasing demand: the problem is over-consumption. When I raised precisely this fact during Q&A it was entirely ignored, as if I hadn’t said it at all.

Those who are in a position of power and authority, or those seeking such a position, do not want to give any consideration to slowing down, stopping, reversing, or changing the paradigm of economic growth. Some individual citizens of Long Island recognize that this is what is needed, but my experience is that they are merely paying lip service to the truth with no intent or desire to implement a real Powerdown strategy in their community or in their own life.

Long Island has so many resources it could certainly deal with Peak very well if sound thinking prevailed. Even I have many ideas for municipalities and public space here on the Island as energy (and inevitably food) prices skyrocket, but I worry that any effort to implement even a single concept would be wasting valuable time that could produce real results in other endeavors.

This is what Richard Heinberg and I discussed during lunch. Heinberg is now promoting “The Oil Depletion Protocols,” which is the title of his upcoming book that outlines a plan for nations to start decreasing the amount of oil they produce and consume. Where I have doubts about trying to influence public policy, Heinberg has now fully dedicated his efforts to just such an endeavor.

“But what about the lifeboats?” I asked as we waited on a buffet line.

“The lifeboats may be the most important of all,” said Heinberg, “but if there is a global oil war I’m afraid the lifeboats won’t have a chance and we could all go down!” Extinction.

“If there is a global oil war, I think the lifeboats are our only hope!” I responded.

“You might be right,” said Heinberg.

The term “lifeboats” is the name given by Heinberg to the Intentional Community and Eco-Village movements, where sustainable living practices for food, water, energy, and transportation are being developed and implemented.

In Heinberg’s view, a global oil war must be avoided at all cost, and the best protocol he knows of to make such an attempt is what he is promoting in his new book. I mentioned to him that this effort may ultimately be futile, and he is well aware of that, but this is the path he has chosen for himself and his legacy. FTW has determined that the likelihood of getting The Powers...
In Simmons’ absence, Heinberg inherited the position of keynote speaker, and he was flawless. There is just something about the way he handles the material, losing none of the profound impact that the subject matter demands while maintaining a vocal composition of peace and tranquility. His personal presentations are matched in completeness only by his written works such as The Party’s Over and Powerdown.

Throughout the day Heinberg’s presentation was repeatedly referenced by both panelists and participants as “depressing.” I could only choke back laughter and wonder what everyone was going to think of James Howard Kunstler’s blunt, pessimistic, sarcastic, unapologetic and at times even crude presentation. Before Kunstler was up to bat, John Hritcko spoke on the growing LNG industry. He never mentioned the very unpopular Broadwater LNG project planned for the Long Island Sound that he is heading for Shell – the largest player in the LNG market today.

Hritcko danced around the issue of Peak saying that Shell doesn’t necessarily disagree with the information Heinberg had just presented. His presentation was filled with charts showing that worldwide gas supplies should be adequate to meet growing demand well into the future as well as growth projections for the LNG market.

Kunstler’s presentation – as always – focused on the psychological dysfunction of American culture. He spent a good amount of his time degrading corporate executives who point to graphs and diagrams as if they hold any significance to what we are really talking about. He said this gives people the illusive feeling that they are in control of an out-of-control situation. It did not go unnoticed that this was precisely what Hritcko, a corporate executive with Shell, had just finished doing.

During his presentation Kunstler repeatedly stated that there isn’t going to be a hydrogen economy, at least not one of any significant size as we are being told by the likes of Jeremy Rifkin and others. Kunstler is correct. Even former Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, agrees with him on this point!

“We should forget about 95 percent of our effort on hydrogen fuel cells for transportation,” said James Woolsey in his testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on November 16, 2005. “We found on the National Energy Policy Commission that, quote, ‘Hydrogen offers little to no potential to improve oil security and reduce climate change risks in the next 20 years.’… Hydrogen fuel cells for transportation in the near term are, in my judgment, a snare and a delusion and we should stop spending the kind of money on them that we are spending now.”

Kunstler also continually tongue-lashed students and young entrepreneurs who insist that technology will solve our energy problems.

“Technology is not energy,” demanded Kunstler.

Immediately following Kunstler’s presentation, David G. Schieren, Chairman and CEO of EmPower LLC, a local alternative energy firm and conference sponsor, took to the podium to moderate the Q&A session. Schieren, who has just graduated from NYIT with a Masters degree, looked Kunstler dead in his eyes and ensured him – and the entire audience – that hydrogen does have a bright future.

I will not be living on Long Island for much longer.

1 Visit http://www.energyshock.org for more information on TEETERING ON THE BRINK. It appears this may be an annual or ongoing series.

[It is as we unravel the lies of the Pat Tillman case that we begin to grasp both the depravity and the venality of those who command the US military. – MCR]

The Tillman Files - Part 5
Emergencies

by Stan Goff

FTW Military/Veterans Affairs Editor

General Myers Visits Afghanistan

Associated Press
April 16, 2004

KABUL, Afghanistan - Gen. Richard B. Myers, the chairman of the U.S. joint chiefs of staff, headed to Afghanistan on Friday amid a stepped up campaign to kill or capture Osama bin Laden and a growing urgency to stabilize the country for historic elections.

His visit comes one day after an audiotape purportedly recorded in the past few weeks by bin Laden offered European nations a truce if they pull troops out of Muslim countries and vowed violence against the United States and Israel.

The al-Qaida chief and his right-hand man, Egyptian surgeon Ayman al-Zawahri, are believed hiding in the craggy mountains between Pakistan and Afghanistan, but a 2 1/2 year dragnet has failed to catch them. The military recently pulled back from predictions that bin Laden would be caught sometime this year. In the past month, Washington has sent 2,000 Marines to Afghanistan to beef up a U.S.-led force that had already numbered 13,000 soldiers.

The military has vowed a sweeping spring offensive to crush Taliban and al-Qaida holdouts ahead of presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for September.
The United Nations and others have warned that the elections will fail if security cannot be improved.

Taliban insurgents attacked Afghan soldiers in eastern Khost province, along the border with Pakistan, killing two soldiers and injuring two others, Gen. Khial Bas, the local Afghan military commander, told The Associated Press on Friday. He said nine militants were killed in the exchange of rocket and machine-gun fire on Wednesday...

Ex-NFL star Tillman makes ‘ultimate sacrifice’

Safety, who gave up big salary to join Army, killed in Afghanistan

NBC, MSNBC and news services
Updated: 3:39 a.m. ET April 26, 2004

WASHINGTON - Pat Tillman, who gave up the glamorous life of a professional football star to join the Army Rangers, was remembered as a role model of courage and patriotism Friday after military officials said he had been killed in action in Afghanistan.

“Pat Tillman was an inspiration on and off the football field, as with all who have made the ultimate sacrifice in the war on terror. His family is in the thoughts and prayers of President and Mrs. Bush,” Taylor Gross, a spokesman for the White House, said in a statement.

Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., the author of a recent book about courage, said he was “heartbroken” and raised the prospect that the tragic loss of this extraordinary young man” could be “a heavy blow to our nation’s morale, as it is surely a grievous injury to his loved ones.”

Tillman, 27, was a member of the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, based at Fort Lewis, Wash. The battalion was involved in Operation Mountain Storm in southeastern Afghanistan, part of the U.S. campaign against fighters of the al-Qaida terror network and the former Taliban government along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, military officials told NBC News. U.S. military spokesman Lt. Col. Matthew Beevers said Saturday that Tillman was killed Thursday night in a firefight at about 7 p.m. on a road near Sperah, about 25 miles southwest of a U.S. base at Khost.

After coming under fire, Tillman’s patrol got out of their vehicles and gave chase, moving toward the spot of the ambush. Beevers said the fighting was “sustained” and lasted 15-20 minutes. Beevers said Tillman was killed by enemy fire, but he had no information about what type of weapons were involved in the assault, or whether he died instantly.

An Afghan militiaman fighting alongside Tillman also was killed, and two other U.S. soldiers were wounded.

A local Afghan commander, Gen. Khial Bas, told The Associated Press that nine enemy fighters were killed in the confrontation.

Pat Tillman and an Afghan militiaman – who even the Department of Defense hasn’t seen fit to identify with his actual name, and the intrepid militia of said General Bas prove again that they have the remarkable ability to kill exactly nine enemy in each confrontation.

The latter story was given out by the Public Affairs Officer in Kabul, Matthew Beevers. Some overworked, under-slept E-5 writing that day’s scripted message slipped up and mixed the boilerplates. The point is, there was no attention being paid to real events except to re-script them. The “official” statement is always, first and last, designed to prop up a public perception, not inform or educate the public… far from it.

This kind of thing happens when too many cooks are in the kitchen and supper is late. There were already a lot of cooks in the kitchen in April 2004, and Pat’s death by fratricide constituted a major emergency for them all.

This was triage by committee.

With the reader’s forbearance, I need to reiterate and fold in some of the main premises from earlier editions of The Tillman Files.

In our last installment of The Tillman Files, we attempted to generally reconstruct what had happened in the firefight that led to Pat Tillman’s death. We cannot claim perfect accuracy for this account any more than any other journalistic organ can, because the witnesses themselves were making eyewitness accounts, the original statements by the participants were not made for days after the incident, and the original investigation was torn up when it proved too politically sensitive to ever see the light of day. The statements taken during the second investigation, where the investigating officer had a tremendous conflict of interest, had been altered.

The case that we are making here is – in legal jargon – circumstantial. The case for which the Department of Defense has settled so far is based on eyewitness statements, some of which have changed and many of which were obviously being coached and led when one reads the transcripts of the interviews – and we have all of them from the second and third iteration of investigation. It needs to be pointed out, since the military is hiding behind legal customs and cultural biases about evidence, that the
record of accuracy for circumstantial evidence is acutely stronger than that for eyewitness testimony.

The association of physical evidence with time-space correlations is what circumstantial evidence is. If I have purchased a gun at store X at 3:15 PM on a given day, twenty miles from my home, and an ATM machine records a withdrawal by me one block from the store at 3 PM, that does not “prove” that I bought the gun... but it sure as hell places me within range of the gun store at the right time. If the gun store owner is asked who was at the store at 3:15 on that day, and can he identify me, when even a few days have passed, what exactly will he remember... really? How many readers can remember exactly what happened yesterday at 3:15 PM?

In fact, studies suggest that as many as 5,000 wrongful convictions happen in the US each year based on eyewitness testimony. That is why, in an earlier edition, I made the provocative claim that law – and the legalism that is used as a cover by public officials – is not science-based. It is the manifestation of custom, precedent, and has a deeply religious character – complete with church-like courtrooms designed to inspire awe and obedience, oye-oye incantations to ritualize its activity, and even priestly robes for the presiding judges.

A trial, for example, is one exercise of the law. The so-called objectivity of the law, which pretends it has no point of view, renders the law a mirror of the status-quo. Every assumption that holds sway, with or without the formal recognition of the law, enters the courtroom, then, as a fact of nature – a universality, something above and immune from the actual living bodies and all their turbulent histories in the courtroom. This is why every trial that purports to be objective is a lie. This reflection of the status quo that calls itself objectivity, and pretends it has no point of view, reflects power and surrounds that power in a force field of invisibility.

This series wants to look behind that legalism, to establish, as far as possible, what the circumstances were before, during, and after the actual firefight, and give the public a peek at the muttering functionaries behind the legal curtain of the Great Oz. There is no way to understand what happened once Pat Tillman fell on April 22 without tearing down that curtain, without rejecting the myth of legal “objectivity.”

We will begin, instead, with the denied reality that Pat Tillman’s death was an “emergency” on multiple scales. We will not begin with the disingenuousness of the boss.

What were these emergencies, and for whom?

On April 22nd, the day Pat was killed, Rumsfeld was chastising the press for not telling the public the “good news” about what was happening in Iraq and Afghanistan. He said that because there was no good news, unless you were a partisan of the Iraqi resistance or an opium farmer in Afghanistan.

Lawrence Di Rita will be remembered, if at all, by history as the guy who was elected to deny that there was any evidence available to the Pentagon that desecration of the Koran, including putting them in the toilet, was a regular part of detainee abuse in the Guantanamo Bay concentration camp.

Di Rita is the Principle Deputy Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs; but he is also one of Rumsfeld’s closest advisors, a veteran of the Heritage Foundation, one of the premier neo-con think-tanks leading the charge to invade Iraq. Di Rita is a very influential character. There is little doubt that he was intimately involved in the damage control over Pat Tillman being killed by fellow Rangers. Rumsfeld runs the entire Department of Defense; and Lawrence Di Rita is specifically assigned to the chief coordinator of Pentagon perception management.

“In the battle of perception management,” said Di Rita said in December 2004, “where the enemy is clearly using the media to help manage perceptions of the general public, our job is not perception management but to counter the enemy’s perception management.” This was Di Rita’s defense of the Information Operations Roadmap referenced in Part 3 of this series – the same program that replaced the Office of Strategic Influence, the first Pentagon program to plant false stories in the news as part of “operations.”

Our job is not to lie, but to tell counter-lies – the modern day equivalent of the Devil made me do it.

When Pat Tillman was killed on April 22, 2004, the stories about detainee abuse at Guantanamo Bay were already boiling over, and Di Rita was putting in a lot of late nights on this story. The four “civilians” that were killed and burned in the ambush at Fallujah were not having the desired effect of mobilizing outrage so much as they were drawing attention to the extensive use of brutal mercenaries by the Department of Defense.

That incident then obliged the Rumsfeld Pentagon to demonstrate its collective masculinity by attempting the destruction of the entire city of Fallujah. The attack failed, and a second front opened up in Najaf after US troops killed Shia demonstrators protesting the Coalition Provisional Authority that had arbitrarily shut down one of their newspapers. The Abu Ghraib scandal was to be broken by 60 Minutes on April 28th, though the televised news magazine had informed the Pentagon of their intent to air two weeks prior... around April 15th.

By the time the news that Pat Tillman had been killed by friendly fire arrived at Di Rita’s and Rumsfeld’s offices, presumably around April 24th, the Public Affairs Office was overwhelmed, and the issue had to be triaged. In fact, two forms of triage were in demand: (1) they had to step on bad news – especially anything that ran counter to the tale of ubiquitous professionalism they needed to counter the recurring stories of US abuse, and (2) they needed, as Rumsfeld noted on the fateful day, “good news.” John Abazaid, commander of Central Command, was embroiled in the breaking Abu Ghraib scandal even as he was losing a two-front campaign in Najaf and Fallujah. Someone who was not similarly tangled up would have to handle the Tillman episode for the moment, with only general guidance: no reports on fratricide, not right now, and turn this into something that re-kindle American patriotic feeling for the war.

General Kensinger, presumably, was given the guidance from Abazaid’s staff. Kensinger passed it along to the logical person
– LTC Ralph Kauzlaurich. Before the after-action review was even conducted, Kauzlaurich’s staff and sub-unit commanders had worked out the outlines. A Silver Star and a tale of American heroism. It wouldn’t be until CPT Richard Scott, the HHC/A-75 Company Commander, filed his Article 15-6 investigation findings that Kauzlaurich would begin to appreciate how bad this was going to make him, and his chain of command look.

He had an emergency. And with that emergency, another troop had one, too. SSG Greg Baker, the NCO in charge of the killer vehicle outside of Manah on April 22nd. Kauzlaurich’s creation of a “false sense of urgency” amid the pressure from Rumsfeld’s Pentagon to “show success,” was now paired with Baker’s fate under the cloud of a criminal negligence charge that could spread to his whole crew that day, in one report – written by Captain Richard Scott. That report – which was the result of an Article 15-6 investigation that was completed – had to disappear. And disappear it did.

This story, with both its circumstantial evidence and its conjectures, would not be written today had it not been for Pat Tillman’s brother, Kevin.

The Rangers were compelled, according to one of the members of the Battalion, to sign secrecy statements about the whole incident that forbade them to discuss any details of the killing of Pat Tillman for 80 years – that is, after all of us are dead. Scott’s report was to disappear down that same memory hole.

Kevin Tillman, who was scooped up from Manah in a helicopter that fateful day and sent home, did not learn that his brother had been killed by members of his own platoon for five weeks. When he did learn, he informed his chain of command that he could no longer bear to work at A Company, and he was reassigned to Headquarter and Headquarters Company, with the Battalion sniper section… Richard Scott’s company.

It was here that Kevin started bothering people with questions, a lot of question, because the answers he was getting made no sense. It was during one of these casual interrogations that Scott let slip to Kevin that he had conducted a complete Article 15-6 investigation, prior to the one now on record, overseen by LTC Kauzlaurich. Had it not been for that one slip, General Gary Jones would have never been compelled, in the wake of the McCain Congressional inquiry, to interview Scott, where Scott went on the record that the original statements from the members of Baker’s vehicle had been altered for the second investigation, with regard to the distance, the light conditions, and the duration and spacing of the lethal fires.

With that revelation, all the emergencies that had been quelled were reborn.

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